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Abstract
We use the population of UK corporation tax returns between 2001 and
2008 to estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to
the statutory corporation tax rate. We analyse bunching in the distribution of
taxable income at two kinks in the marginal rate schedule. We nd an elasticity
of between 0.14 and 0.18 for companies with prots around the £ 300k kink,
implying a marginal deadweight cost of 8%. We nd a much higher elasticity
of between 0.54 and 0.57 for companies around the £ 10k kink. By matching the
corporate tax return data with accounting records and analysing joint bunching
in the corporate and personal tax system, we decompose this into two parts:
an elasticity of total income with respect to the net of tax rate of between 0.2
and 0.3, and an elasticity of the share of income taken as prot with respect
to the di¤erence between the personal and corporate tax rates of between 0.04
and 0.07. These imply a marginal deadweight cost of the tax around £ 10k of
around 25%. We nd no evidence of intertemporal shifting of prot.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature has examined the marginal excess burden of personal income
tax. Following seminal contributions from Feldstein (1995, 1999), this literature has
derived estimates of the marginal excess burden of the tax from estimates of the elasti-
city of taxable income. This approach does not require di¤erentiation of the various
channels through which the tax may a¤ect behaviour - for example, a reduction in
e¤ort or a rise in tax evasion - as long as all of these behaviours are optimally chosen
by the economic agent. A number of papers have developed this approach further
to consider cases when the elasticity is, and is not, a su¢ cient statistic for meas-
uring the marginal excess burden (this literature is reviewed by Saez, Slemrod and
Giertz (2012)). There have also been several developments in empirical approaches
to measuring the elasticity (also reviewed by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012)).
Relatively little attention has been paid to other taxes, and in particular to the
corporate income tax. Although the corporate income tax typically raises consid-
erably less revenue than the personal income tax, it has the potential to generate
a very large excess burden. In most countries, most private economic behaviour is
organised by corporations. And corporations can modify their behaviour in a number
of ways in response to taxation, for example: changing the scale of production and
hence the demand for labour, capital and other factors; the choice of nancial policy;
and the international location of real activities and prot. The e¤ects of taxation
on all of these forms of behaviour have been widely studied, and many margins have
been found to be sensitive to taxation. There is also considerable evidence that gov-
ernments have for some decades been engaged in international competition that is
driving down statutory rates of corporation tax (Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2007)); such competition arises from a belief that high tax rates drive both real
activity and taxable prots abroad. In addition, governments are rightly concerned
about the extent to which di¤erences in taxes on unincorporated and incorporated
businesses a¤ect the incorporation decision, and permit the shifting of income to a
lower-taxed form. Despite these issues, there has as yet been little attempt to analyse
the elasticity of corporate taxable income, and the corresponding marginal excess
burden.1
This paper estimates the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to the
statutory tax rate in the UK, using condential tax return data provided by HMRC.
1Two published papers that estimate the elasticity of corproate taxable income are Gruber and
Rauh (2007) and Dwenger and Steiner (2012). We discuss these further below.
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We have access to the population of corporation tax returns (around 1 million returns
per year) for an 8-year period 2001/02-2008/09. This period is useful since it provides
variation in the statutory corporate tax rate in two dimensions. First, the UK tax
system applies di¤erent rates of tax at di¤erent levels of income. In particular, there
is a signicant increase in the rate at taxable income of £ 300,000, creating a kink in
the tax rate schedule. This allows the elasticity of taxable income to be estimated
by analysing bunching at the kink, following the approach proposed by Saez (2010),
and widely used and developed since.2 Second, there have been a number of reforms
to the tax rate schedule over this period. In particular, the UK introduced a zero
starting rate of tax for the rst £ 10,000 of taxable income, starting in 2002. The rate
that applied to income between £ 10,000 and £ 50,000 was raised so that the average
tax rate on income of £ 50,000 and above was una¤ected. Two years later, this was
modied by applying the zero rate only to retained earnings. And in 2006 the zero
rate was abolished. As a result of these reforms, a signicant kink in the tax schedule
was rst introduced, then modied, then abolished, all within the period of our data.
An important feature of the taxation of small companies, and in particular of
companies where the owner and manager are the same person (or at least a small
group), is that the owner/manager can decide whether to take income from the com-
pany in the form of corporate prot or personal income. A rise in the corporate tax
rate may therefore induce a reduction in total income generated by the company, and
also a reduction in the proportion declared as corporate prot. The excess burden of
the corporation tax depends on the size of both these e¤ects, since the latter reects
simply that some income is being taxed at a di¤erent rate. In the UK during this
period, the tax rate on corporate prot, even including personal tax on dividends
paid, was generally lower than the overall tax rate on personal income (including
national insurance contributions). Tax minimisation typically required declaring all
- or virtually all - income above the tax-free allowance as corporate prot.
To analyse the share of total income declared as corporate prot, we combine the
corporation tax return data with accounting data for each company and each year
from the FAME database. We are able to match approximately 90% of corporation
tax returns in this way. Accounting data include information on the remuneration
paid to the directors of the company. For small companies we take the total taxable
income of the company to be the sum of the corporate taxable income and directors
remuneration.
Analysis of these combined data reveal that very few companies followed a pure
2See, for example, Chetty et al. (2011).
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tax minimisation strategy, with almost all declaring a signicant part of their total
income as personal income. One possible explanation of this is a salience problem:
small business owners may typically take their income as personal income, but they
may have been aware, for example, of the £ 10,000 tax-free corporate prot. They
may not have understood that declaring more than £ 10,000 as corporate prot may
reduce their tax liability further. However, while possible, this seems to imply that
such businesses did not use professional advice in completing their tax returns, even
though it is relatively complex to set up and administer a company to comply with
UK law. An alternative explanation is that there are other costs associated with
declaring income as corporate prot. This may reect a liquidity issue. While wages
are typically paid regularly - weekly or monthly - dividends are typically paid less
frequently. A small business owner may prefer to receive a regular ow of income,
thereby avoiding the cost of additional borrowing. We do not model this explicitly
in the paper, but we introduce a convex cost of declaring income as corporate prot
which is intended to reect such costs.
An alternative way of reducing tax liabilities for some companies could be to shift
prot from one period to another. This would result in lower overall tax if a company
moved its position in the marginal rate schedule, so that taxable prot in consecutive
years would be liable to tax at di¤erent marginal rates. In this case there would be
an advantage to shifting prot into the period taxed at the lower marginal rate, up to
the kink point at which the marginal rate changes. We show that this would tend to
push observed growth rates for such companies closer to zero, implying a narrowing
of the distribution of growth rates. We analyse the data to attempt to identify such
e¤ects, and nd no evidence of intertemporal prot shifting around the £ 10k tax kink.
Two issues are not addressed explicitly in this paper. First, consideration of the
intertemporal dimension raises issues about the type of behavioural response of a
company to the marginal tax rate in the current period. For example, the response
is less likely to be due to changes in the investment decisions which may depend on
the anticipated tax rates over the life of the investment, and not just in the current
period. We do not explore here the type of behavioural response, but focus only on
the within-period elasticity of taxable income. Second, changes in the corporation
tax rate, especially the introduction of the zero starting rate, may induce e¤ects on
the extensive margin of the choice of legal form. There was a signicant increase
in the number of companies when the starting rate was introduced. However, we
focus solely on the elasticity of corporate taxable income, conditional on the business
having corporate form and therefore begin liable to corporation tax on its prot.
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Section 2 provides a conceptual framework for analysing the elasticity of corporate
taxable income with respect to the statutory rate, which draws on the personal tax
literature of, for example, Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009). The framework used
allows for both forms of response to a change in the corporation tax rate: a shift
in total income and a shift between the two alternative ways of declaring income.
One di¤erence from the literature on personal tax is worth noting. That is, in the
personal tax literature, it is typically assumed that the costs of generating additional
income are not tax deductible: they are typically assumed to reect e¤ort or hours
worked. However, companies generate total income in a variety of ways in addition to
the labour supply of the owner: for example, through greater investment and hiring
labour, both of which generate a deduction. They may also avoid or evade tax; the
costs of doing so may or may not generate a deduction, depending on whether there
is an observable charge. Any deductibility of costs against taxable prot a¤ects the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rate. In an extreme case, suppose
that all costs are deductible. Then in a standard framework the tax rate would have
no e¤ect on taxable income or output; in e¤ect the tax would be levied only on
economic rent, and no behavioural decisions would depend on the tax rate. Although
in practice this is unlikely - even if all capital costs are deductible - this does suggest
that it is possible that the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rate
could be small.
The main empirical technique used in this paper is based on the analysis of bunch-
ing at kinks in the tax schedule, developed by Saez (2010) and extended by Chetty
et al. (2011). The basic idea of this approach is that an increase in the tax rate at a
certain kink point in the tax schedule is likely to induce agents to reduce their tax-
able income. Those relatively close to the kink would not reduce their taxable income
below the kink point, implying that there would be bunching in the distribution at
the kink point. To identify the scale of this bunching, it is necessary to estimate
the counterfactual of what the distribution would have been without the kink in the
tax schedule. Saez (2010) proposed estimating this counterfactual distribution by
considering only agents whose income are not a¤ected by the kink. Chetty et al.
(2011) modied this approach slightly to ensure that the estimated counterfactual
distribution is based on the same population as the observed empirical distribution.
We follow this approach, and also allow for regular bunching at round-numbers in
the distribution, as proposed by Kleven and Waseem (2012). In addition, when ana-
lysing bunching at the £ 10,000 kink, we compare these counterfactual distributions
with the observed distribution in the period following the abolition of the kink, when
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the incentive to bunch had been removed. Our estimates are fairly insensitive to the
estimation method of the counterfactual distribution.
Companies that are owned and managed by one person, or a small group, have
greater opportunity to choose the form in which income is received. For such compan-
ies, especially those bunched at the £ 10,000 kink, we decompose the overall elasticity
into two parts, reecting the e¤ect on total income and the e¤ect on the share of
income taken as corporate prot. Our approach exploits kinks arising in the personal
tax schedule, which create bunching also in personal taxable income. Specically, we
follow the same approach as already described, but for the subset of companies where
the total remuneration of directors is observed to be at the rst kink in the personal
income tax schedule. Since they are at this kink, we assume that such companies
would not change their personal income in response to a marginal change in the cor-
poration tax rate. Under this assumption, then any response in corporate taxable
income to a change in the corporation tax rate must reect a response in total income.
This identies one element of the elasticity, and allows us to decompose the overall
elasticity into its two components.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a brief review of
the relevant literature. In Section 3 we present a conceptual framework for analysing
the impact of the corporation tax rate on corporate taxable income allowing for two
e¤ects: on the total income generated by the company, and on the share of that
income that is declared as corporate prot, as opposed to personal income. Section
4 describes the empirical approach used in estimating the elasticity of the tax base
with respect to the tax rate, and our method for decomposing that elasticity into
the two parts. Section 5 presents the relevant institutional background for the UK.
Sections 6 and 7 present our results from analysing two kink points in the UK tax
schedule: at £ 300k and at £ 10k. Section 8 presents our analysis of the possibility of
intertemporal shifting of prot. Section 9 discusses the implied marginal deadweight
costs of corporate income taxes using our elasticity estimates. Section 10 briey
concludes.
2 Previous Literature
The literature on the elasticity of personal taxable income with respect to the marginal
personal tax rate has been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz
(2012)) and so does not require a lengthy review here. Briey, this literature has
focused on marginal e¢ ciency cost of public funds taking into account (implicitly) all
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of the various behavioural margins that may be a¤ected by taxation. The idea, from
Feldstein (1995, 1999) is that it is not necessary to identify each of the behavioural
e¤ects separately as long as agents are optimising. That is because all of the e¤ects are
aggregated into an e¤ect on taxable income: the marginal cost of additional e¤ort and
the marginal cost of additional evasion, for example, must both equal the tax rate.
There are some caveats to this claim. One is that taxable income may be shifted
to another base where it will be taxed at a di¤erent rate. The overall impact on
the marginal cost of funds therefore needs to recognise the additional revenue raised
elsewhere. This includes the possibility that tax may be deferred until a later date. A
second caveat is that the appropriate policy response to a high elasticity may depend
on the behavioural change induced by the tax. In particular, the policy response to
greater avoidance should be di¤erent to the policy response to a real e¤ect of, say,
lower e¤ort. Nevertheless, this approach does o¤er a direct method of estimating the
overall e¤ect of taxation.
Various methods have been used to identify the elasticity of personal taxable in-
come: Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) report that the best available estimates
range from 0.12 to 0.4, with a mean elasticity estimate of around 0.25. It is worth
nothing that the few studies using bunching around kink points to identify behavi-
oural responses nd in general small elasticities of taxable income. For example, Saez
(2010) estimates the elasticity of taxable income to be approximately 0.2 around the
rst kink point in the U.S. personal tax schedule and zero (and precisely estimated)
around the higher kink points. Chetty et al. (2011) identify that the observed elasti-
city from bunching at the large 30% top kink in the Danish tax schedule is around
0.01 for all wage earners and around 0.02 for married women. They attribute the
small elasticity estimates to the presence of optimization frictions including switching
and attention costs combined with a small utility gain of bunching in response to
jumps in marginal tax rates. Kleven and Waseem (2012) present evidence of behavi-
oural responses to notch points in the Pakistan income tax system. They adjust the
amount of bunching below the notch points by the fraction of taxpayers that respond
to the tax incentives to estimate the long-run elasticity of taxable income that is
not attenuated by optimization frictions. The baseline results suggest the long-run
elasticity of taxable income in Pakistan is around 0.05 and 0.2, which is considerably
larger than ndings in the other two studies but is nevertheless at the low-range of
the elasticity estimates in the existing literature. One general conclusion from these
studies is that the elasticity of taxable income depends itself on the tax system: one
with a broad tax base and extensive use of information reporting is usually associated
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with more modest responses in personal taxable income.
Fewer studies have directly addressed the elasticity of corporate taxable income.
Two published papers have focused on corporation tax: Gruber and Rauh (2007) and
Dwenger and Steiner (2012). The rst of these uses accounting data and therefore
su¤ers from the familiar problem that accounting records do not generally accur-
ately record tax liabilities, but rather an estimated provision for tax. It estimates
the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to a measure of the e¤ective
marginal tax rate on new investment, of the form developed by Hall and Jorgenson
(1967), King and Fullerton (1984) and others. This implies a focus on one particular
behavioural response to the tax which is not in the spirit of the literature on the
personal tax. The second paper uses German tax administration data to estimate
the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to an average tax rate. This
average tax rate is equal to the statutory rate except where losses brought forward
from the previous period can be used to reduce the current tax liability. This paper
follows the approach of Gruber and Saez (2002) in identifying the e¤ects of a tax re-
form by calculating the tax that would have been paid pre-reform if the post-reform
regime had been in place but there had been no behavioural change. The di¤erence
from actual taxable income post-reform is therefore due to the behavioural response
to the reform. In this case, however, the di¤erence in the average tax rate appears to
depend crucially on the losses brought forward into the period prior to the reform,
rather than the behavioural response to the reform.
The existing empirical literature, on the other hand, provides strong and convin-
cing evidence that corporate taxes inuence business behaviour in several important
ways. For example, the tax di¤erence between corporate and non-corporate earnings
play an important role in rmschoice of organizational forms.3 Companies alter their
nancing choices in response to the tax advantage of debt and other tax incentives,4
and also the scale of business investment5 and dividend payouts.6 Several recent
3See, Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), Gordon and Slemrod
(2000), Goolsbee (1998, 2004), and Liu (2012) for evidence in the U.S. and de Mooij and Nicodeme
(2008) and Egger, Keuschnigg and Winner (2009) for experience in Europe.
4Graham (2003) reviews the empicial evidence of corporate taxes on the nancial policy of do-
mestic rms. Altshuler and Grubert (2003), Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) and Fuest, Hebous and
Riedel (2011), among others, suggest that corporate tax rates and thin capitalization rules also
matter for the nancial structure of multinational rms.
5See Hassett and Hubbard (2002) for a recent survey on this topic. A small selection of recent
studies on tax policy and business investment include Caballero and Engel (1999), Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), and House and Shapiro (2008).
6See, for example, Bond, Chennells and Devereux (1996), Chetty and Saez (2005) and Dharmap-
ala, Foley and Forbes (2011).
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studies survey the international aspects of corporate taxes and business behaviour,
including de Mooij and Nicodeme (2008) and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). These
conclude that there are signicant e¤ects of corporate tax policies on multinationals
location decision, cross-border investment, and allocation of taxable income among
taxing jurisdictions.
3 Conceptual Framework
Consider a company that aims to maximize the total net prot of the shareholders,
:
 = y   c(y)  T   h(s)B, (1)
where y is the total output of the company with the output price normalized to unity
and c (y) is the minimum cost of producing y using a combination of inputs. This min-
imum cost varies across companies, depending on a number of possible characteristics,
including the expertise of the owners and managers; there is therefore heterogeneity
in output choices across companies.
T is the total tax paid by the company including any taxes on dividends paid by
shareholders:
T = (B   A) + E (2)
where  is the overall marginal tax rate, B is total taxable income, A is the lowest
point of the relevant tax band, and E represents tax levied at other rates on income
below A. The total tax base, B, is dened as:
B = y   c(y), (3)
where 0    1 is the proportion of the total cost of generating y that is tax
deductible. This cost includes items that are entirely deductible such as wages
paid to employees, items that may not be deductible at all such as the e¤ort of
an owner/manager, and the costs of capital investment which may be partially de-
ductible. In the case where c reects greater e¤ort, it is measured in units of foregone
consumption.
Total prot can be taxed in two ways, depending on whether the income is declared
as corporate prot or as salary accruing to at least some of the shareholders. Assuming
that allowances are common across the two forms of taxation (as in the UK), then
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total taxable income can be split across the two taxes with Bc applying to prot
and Bp applying to salary, so that B = Bc + Bp. Similarly the lowest points on the
tax schedule for which the relevant marginal rates apply are AC and AP for prot
and salary respectively, with A = AC + AP . A share s of B is recorded in the form
of prot, and the remaining share 1   s is recorded in the form of salary, so that
s = Bc=B. A share s of taxable prot in the relevant tax band B  A is recorded in
the form of prot, so that s = (Bc Ac)=(B A) = (sB Ac)=(B A). The overall
marginal tax rate is
 = stc + (1  s) tp; (4)
where tc is the tax rate on corporate prot and tp is the tax rate on salary of share-
holders that are employed by the company.
Note that, in the empirical application of the UK, generally tp > tc. We therefore
introduce a convex cost of transforming a unit of total taxable income income into
prot, h(s), which implies that not all income is declared as prot. We treat this cost
as a real resource cost, rather than a transfer, and hence it reduces not only private
consumption but also total welfare. For simplicity we assume that this cost is not
deductible, reecting nondeductible e¤orts of the owner/manager.7 We consider only
the case in which total taxable income is non-negative, B  0.
The company chooses y and s to maximize . As long as the company is not at
any kink in the tax rate schedules, the rst order conditions are
c0(y) =
1  ( + h(s))
1  ( + h(s)) ; (5)
and
h0(s) = tp   tc. (6)
The rst of these expressions implies the normal marginal condition: that output
will be increased up to the point where the marginal value of output is equal to its
marginal cost. In the absence of tax, this is just 1. In the presence of tax, the cost
depends on the parameters of the tax regime, and on the costs of declaring income
as prot. We assume that the cost function varies across companies implying that
di¤erent companies choose di¤erent outputs. The second expression indicates that
the company will increase the share of total income declared as prot up to the point
at which the marginal cost, h0(s), is equal to the gain, tp   tc.
We are interested in the impact of corporation tax on total welfare, which we
7Making these costs tax deductible has no qualitative e¤ect on the basic model.
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take to be a simple aggregate of private consumption plus tax revenue, W =  + T .
Consider a small increase in the net of corporate tax rate, 1  tc. Since the company
is assumed to optimally choose y and s to maximize , we can apply the envelope
theorem to ignore any indirect e¤ects of the change in 1  tc on  through y and s.8
In addition, the direct e¤ects of a change in the tax rate on the tax liability net out
since the tax is simply a transfer, reducing , but increasing T . The overall e¤ect on
welfare is therefore:
dW =

@T
@y
@y
@ (1  tc) +
@T
@s
@s
@ (1  tc)

d (1  tc) , (7)
Given that the overall tax rate,  , but not the tax base, B, is a function of s, and
holding tp constant, we can also write the e¤ect on welfare as:
dW =


@B
@ (1  tc)  B (tp   tc)
@s
@ (tp   tc)

d (1  tc)
= B

x
(1  tc)   sz

d (1  tc) ,
where x is the elasticity of taxable income, B, with respect to 1   tc and z is the
elasticity of the share of income taken as corporate prot, s, with respect to the
di¤erence in tax rates, tp   tc. Note also that
dB = (1  c0(y)) dy =

1  
1   ( + h(s))

dy. (8)
These expressions indicate that there are o¤setting e¤ects of a rise in 1  tc. For
a given s, a rise in 1   tc would increase output y. However, the extent to which
there is a rise in B depends on the extent to which costs are deductible from tax. In
the standard case considered for personal tax, costs are not deductible, in which case
8The rst-order conditions (5) and (6) do not apply for companies at a kink in the tax schedule,
since they are at a corner solution. In particular, for such companies, a rise in output would reduce
prot: @=@y < 0. For @y=@(1   tc) > 0, this implies that a negative term is missing from the
expression for the welfare e¤ects in (7). If companies at the £ 300k kink declare all income as
corporate prot and therefore have s=1 and @s=@(1   tc) = 0, the welfare expression in (7) is an
upper bound of the overall welfare estimate for companies around £ 300k. However, for companies at
the £ 10k, there is an o¤setting e¤ect from the change in 1  tc on  through s. The welfare e¤ect in
(7) is then not necessarily an upper bound of for companies around £ 10k. In particular, we assume
that for companies at kinks in both the corporate and personal tax rate schedules, @=@s > 0. For
@s=@(1  tc) > 0, this implies that, for such companies, one negative term and one positive term are
missing from the expression for the e¤ects on welfare in (7). Our overall welfare estimate across all
companies is therefore approximate.
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 = 0 and dB = dy. In the other extreme, though, if all costs were deductible, then
 = 1 and dB = 0. This is because at the margin in this case, c0(y) = 1 and the
marginal addition to output is just matched by a marginal addition to costs, leaving
the tax base una¤ected. In general, for 0 <  < 1, dB < dy: there is a smaller e¤ect
on the tax base than on output given a rise in the net of tax rate.
For a given tax base, a rise in tp  tc would induce a higher share of income being
taken as corporate prot. Since we assume that there are real costs associated with
taking income in this form, this would induce higher welfare costs.
We can compare the change in welfare to the mechanical change in tax revenue
in the absence of any behavioral response. Holding y and s constant, the mechanical
change in revenue is
dM =  s (B   A) d (1  tc) ; (9)
where A is the lowest point in the tax bracket at which the tax rate applies. Hence
dW =
Bc
Bc   Ac

z   x
(1  tc) s

dM . (10)
3.1 Implications for empirical approach
To identify empirically the welfare costs associated with the corporate tax rate, it is
necessary to estimate the two elasticities, x and z, as in eq. (10). We discuss the
details of the empirical approach in the next section. First we set out the approach
here in the context of this framework. We dene by e the elasticity of the corporate
tax base Bc with respect to 1  tc. Since Bc = sB, for given tp this elasticity is:
e =
@Bc
@ (1  tc)
(1  tc)
Bc
= s
@B
@ (1  tc)
(1  tc)
sB
+B
@s
@ (1  tc)
(1  tc)
sB
(11)
= x+

1  tc
tp   tc

z.
We take two approaches to identify x and z separately. First, we consider a group
of companies with a large number of directors/shareholders that bunch at the £ 300k
kink in the corporation tax schedule. Second, we consider a subset of companies that
bunch at the £ 10k kink in the corporate tax schedule, but who are also at a kink in
the personal tax rate schedule. We assume that companies in either group will not
change their personal tax base in response to a change in 1  tc. If this is true, then
dB = dBc and so x = e  BcB . Applying this estimate of x to all companies allows us
to decompose e into its components and hence estimate dW .
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For the rst group, this is based on the assumption that the company is widely
enough held that shareholders will not want to transfer income to the managers. For
the second group, this is because if the company is at a kink in the personal tax
schedule (in practice, typically at the rst kink, and therefore paying no personal
income tax), it is unlikely to adjust the personal income it declares in response to a
marginal change in the corporation tax rate. Specically, consider a company that is
at a kink in the marginal tax rate schedule for both taxes. If it receives a marginal
increase in income, it can choose to take that income as prot, or salary, or a mix
of the two. In this case, it is unlikely that the rst order condition (??) holds, since
s is determined by the relative size of the two kinks, which is denoted as bs = Ac=A.
The company will choose to take the whole of the marginal increase in income as
corporate prot if tp   tc > h0(bs).9 The LHS of this inequality reects the tax gain
from declaring the additional income as prot, and the RHS reects the costs of doing
so. We assume that this condition holds, on the grounds that h0(bs) is likely to be
small for companies in this position. In this case, if the marginal increase in income
was induced by a reduction in the corporation tax rate, then the whole of that income
would be declared as corporate prot.
So far we have focused on a single company. To evaluate the total welfare e¤ect
of a change in the tax rate, we need to aggregate over companies. We do so following
Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012). Denote by B the average combined taxable income
of companies within the relevant tax bracket, and s the average share of taxable
income taken as corporate prot. Then we can dene x as the aggregate elasticity of
taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate, which is equal to the average of
the individual elasticities weighted by individual taxable income. Similarly, we can
dene z as the aggregate elasticity of the share with respect to the di¤erence in tax
rates, which is equal to the average of the individual elasticities weighted by individual
shares. Dene the ratio ac = Bc=(Bc   Ac). If the distribution of Bc is Pareto, then
ac is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. Hence, in aggregate, we have:
dW = ac

z   x
(1  tc) s

dM: (12)
Note that, for widely-held companies at the £ 300k kink, we assume that all income
at the margin is declared as prot, and therefore that s = 1 and z = 0. Thus at the
margin,  = tc, e = x, and eq. (12) simplies to the standard formula used in
9Note that as inocme continues to rise, then h0 will also rise, and eventually the rst order
condition will hold.
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the literature for estimating the marginal deadweight cost by a small increase in the
corporate tax rate10:
dW
dM
=   eactc
(1  tc) .
For companies bunching at the personal tax kink, we average over the marginal
deadweight cost for each individual company with taxable prots between £ 10k and
£ 50k:
dW
dM
=
X
ki2($10k;$50k)
Bci
Bci   Ac

z    ix
(1  tc) si

=Nki ;
where the corporate taxable income Bci, the overall e¤ective tax rate on total income
 i, and the proportion of total income taken as corporate prot si are rm-specic
estimates.
4 Empirical Methodology
We use the bunching estimation method proposed in Saez (2010) and Chetty et al.
(2011) to identify the elasticity of corporate taxable income. In the context of cor-
porate income taxes, consider a tax reform that introduces a small increase in the
marginal corporate tax rate from  1 to  2 at some income level K. Taxable income
below K continues to be taxed at the rate  1, and income above K is now taxed
at the rate  2. Abstracting from any income e¤ects, the fraction of companies who
choose to locate at the kink point K in response to the small increase in the marginal
tax rate can be expressed as B( 1;  2) =
R K+z
K
h(z)dz, where h(z) is the density dis-
tribution of taxable income when there is a constant marginal tax rate  1 throughout
the distribution and K+ z the highest level of pre-reform earnings that now bunch
at the kink point. Assuming that h(z) is uniform around the kink, the elasticity of
corporate taxable income at the kink point is
e ' B( 1;  2)=h(K)
K ln(1 1
1 2 )
=
b( 1;  2)
K ln(1 1
1 2 )
; (13)
where b( 1;  2) denotes the fraction of companies who bunch at the kink relative to
the counterfactual density. In eq. (13), the kink point K and the tax rates dening
the kink point,  1 and  2, are given policy parameters, whereas the excess mass of
companies b( 1;  2) needs to be estimated empirically in order to identify e.
We aim to estimate the counterfactual density, that is, the distribution of taxable
10For example, see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012).
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income had there been no kinks in the tax rate schedule, from the observed dens-
ity outside the income range a¤ected by bunching. A complication to the credible
identication of bunching due to tax kinks, however, is that companies have a tend-
ency to report taxable prot in round numbers, generating mass points at integer
numbers in the empirical distribution. This is similar to round-number bunching
in personal taxable income in Kleven and Waseem (2012), although the pattern of
round-number bunching in the corporate taxable income is di¤erent and changes sub-
stantially through the income distribution.11 Since kinks are themselves located at
salient round numbers, a failure to control for round-number bunching could confound
true kink bunching with round-number bunching and overstate behavioural responses
to the kink. Like Kleven and Waseem (2012), we use counterfactual excess bunching
at round numbers that are not kinks to control for round-number bunching.
We rst group companies into small income bins of £ 100. Denoting by cj the
number of companies and zj the level of earnings relative to the kink point in bin
j, we then t a exible polynomial of order q to the bin counts in the empirical
distribution, excluding bins around the kink point in the range (zL; zU) around the
kink point by estimating a regression of the following form:
cj =
qX
l=0
i  (zj)l +
zUX
i=zL
i  1 [zj = i] +
X
r2Rk
rk  1
hzj
r
2 N
i
+ "j; (14)
where i is a bin xed e¤ect for each bin in the excluded range. A set of round-number
dummies is also included to control for bunching at integers. Specically, N is the set
of natural numbers, Rk is a vector of round number multiples that capture rounding in
the annual tax return and equals f5kg or f50kg depending on income bracket k. The
parameter rk is the xed e¤ect associated with round number multiple in income
bracket k. The initial estimate of the counterfactual distribution is the predicted
values from the regression (14) by setting all the dummies in the excluded range to
zero but not omitting the contribution of the round-number dummies:
bc0j = qX
l=0
bi  (zj)l +X
r2Rk
r  1
hzj
r
2 N
i
:
11Round-number bunching is strongest near the bottom of the distribution. There is excess mass
at every income level that is multiple of 5k for prots up to £ 20k and at income levels that are
multiples of 10k between £ 20k and £ 100k. Above £ 100k, excess mass is only noticeable at multiples
of 50k for prots below £ 300k and at multiples of 100k for prots above £ 300k. Outside the context
of taxable income elasticity, Manoli and Weber (2011) also present evidence of individual bunching
around retirement thresholds that are multiples of 10 years.
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The initial estimate of excess bunching, dened as the di¤erence between the observed
and counterfactual bin counts within the excluded range, is given by
bB0 = zUX
j=zL
(cj   bc0j):
This simple calculation overestimates bB for two reasons. First, it fails to account
for the fact that the tax kink induces companies above the threshold to decrease their
taxable income so that the observed distribution to the right of the kink point is
everywhere lower than if there had been no kink. Therefore, the observed number of
companies included in the counterfactual estimation may be higher or lower than the
actual number of companies in the absence of the tax kink. This is a common problem
for standard bunching method using cross-sectional data, although the di¤erence in
the two distributions should get smaller the further away from the kink.12 Second,
it does not account for the fact that bunching companies just above the kink comes
from the region to the right of the kink. To address the second issue, we follow Chetty
et al. (2011) and shift the counterfactual distribution to the right of the kink upward
until it satises the constraint that the area under the counterfactual must equal the
area under the empirical distribution. Specically, bcj are the tted values from the
following regression omitting the contributions of bins in the excluded range:
cj
 
1 + 1 [j > R]
bB0P1
j=ZU+1
cj
!
=
qX
l=0
i(zj)l+
X
r2Rk
r1
hzj
r
2 N
i
+
zUX
i=zL
i1 [zj = i]+"j;
(15)
and bB = PzUj=zL(cj   bcj) is the excess mass implied by this counterfactual.13 The
empirical estimate of b, which is dened as the excess mass around the kink relative
to the average density of the counterfactual distribution where bunching occurs, is
derived as: bb = bBPzU
j=zL
bcj=Nj ,
with Nj the number of bins in the excluded range.
Standard errors are calculated using a residual-based bootstrap approach. From
the regression model specifying the company counts, eq. (15), we obtain the estimated
12To address the rst issue, we use an alternative method to estimate the counterfactual density,
exploring variation in the £ 10k tax kink and the panel structure of the data. The di¤erence between
the elasticity estimates using the two methods appears to be small and statistically insignicant.
13We estimate (15) by iteration and recompute bB using the estimated bi until we reach a xed
point. The reported bootrapped standard errors account for this iteration procedure.
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residual b"j. We draw a new set of errors by sampling from the estimated residuals with
replacement and create bootstrapped company counts by adding the new set of errors
to the original counts, cbj = cj + b"bj. We use the bootstrapped company frequencies
and follow the same steps above to compute new estimates of frequencies and excess
mass. This bootstrap procedure is repeated 500 times and the standard error of the
excess mass is estimated by computing the standard deviation of the 500 estimates.
Finally we estimate the elasticity of taxable income as a non-linear combination of bb,
the tax kink K, and the relative changes in the net-of-tax rate ln(1 1
1 2 ) as in equation
(13). Standard errors of the implied elasticity are then computed using the delta
method.
5 Institutional Background and Data
5.1 Income tax system in the UK: 2001 to 2008
Di¤erent types of income in the UK are subject to di¤erent taxes. Income received
in the form of corporate prots is subject to corporate tax and dividend tax upon
distribution to shareholders. Income received as non-corporate earnings such as wage
and self-employment income, is subject to personal taxes and national insurance
contributions (NICs). In the UK, the tax year for personal tax purposes runs from
April 6 of the current year to April 5 of the next, while the nancial year for corporate
tax purposes runs from April 1 to March 31.14 Unless stated otherwise, all years in
the paper refer to nancial years according to the calendar year in which they end.
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of tax schedules by income type in 2001-2008.
Corporate tax
There are currently two rates that dene the basic structure of the corporate tax
schedule. Taxable prot over £ 1.5 million is taxed at the main rate, which was at
30 percent in 2001-2007 until being reduced to 28 percent in 2008. Companies with
taxable prot below £ 300,000 are taxed at the small prots rate (previously known
as the small companiesrate), which varied around 20 percent in 2001-2008. Taxable
prots between £ 300k and £ 1.5 million are taxed at a higher marginal relief rate of
around 32 percent during most years in this period.15 For example, in 2002, adding £ 1
of taxable prot to £ 300k increases the marginal corporate tax rate from 19 percent
14However, companies typically make tax returns based on their accounting year: these may
therefore span di¤erent tax years.
15The purpose of marginal relief is to ensure that the total tax liability for prot at £ 1.5 million
is equal to the main rate applied to £ 1.5 million.
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to 32.75 percent. This discrete jump in the marginal rate creates a large convex kink
point at £ 300k in the corporate tax rate schedule.
In addition to the small prots rate, an even lower starting rate was applied to
taxable prots between £ 0 and £ 10k for a signicant part of this period. This rate
was 10 percent in 2001, reduced to zero for the next four years, and was eventually
abolished in 2006. While the starting rate was in place, a higher marginal rate
of approximately 20 percent was applied to taxable prots between £ 10,001 and
£ 50k, thus creating another convex kink point at £ 10k. In addition, a non-corporate
distribution rate (NCDR) of 19 percent was levied in 2005 and 2006; this was applied
as a minimum rate to corporate prots distributed to persons who are not companies.
Summarising, there are two large tax kinks at £ 10k and £ 300k before the abolition
of the starting rate in 2006. Since then, a at rate of around 19 percent has been
applied to taxable prots below £ 300k, leaving £ 300k as the only tax kink in the
remaining years during this period. The corporate tax section in Table 1 lists the
marginal rates around the tax kinks by year. While the di¤erence in the marginal
tax rates around £ 300k has remained relatively stable, we observe large and frequent
changes in those around £ 10k due to the reduction and abolition of the starting rate.
Distributed prots in the UK are taxed both at the corporate level (via corporation
tax) and at the personal level (via income tax), although dividend income at the
personal level is not subject to NICs and carries a credit for corporation tax paid.
As a result, the e¤ective dividend tax rate is zero for taxpayers with personal income
below the basic rate threshold and 25 percent for those above throughout the years
2001-2008.
Personal tax and National Insurance Contributions
The tax unit of personal tax in the U.K. is an individual rather than household.
Similar to the corporate tax schedule, personal tax operates through a system of
allowances and income bands that are taxed at a di¤erent rate. Each individual has
a personal allowance, and income up to this amount in each year is exempt from
tax. Above this amount there are a number of tax bands. The basic rate applies to
taxable income within the basic rate band and the higher rate is charged to taxable
income above the basic rate threshold. A starting rate of income tax was also in place
in 2001-2007, which taxed income between the personal allowance and the basic rate
band at 10 percent.
In addition to paying income tax, employees, employers and the self-employed
must also pay national insurance contributions. Employees and employers pay con-
tributions according to a complex classication based on employment type and in-
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come. Class 1 NIC is charged to employees at several rates depending on various
income thresholds, and to employers as well for each employee earning above the
secondary threshold. Earnings below the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) pay no NICs
and received no credit for state pension. Earnings between the LEL and primary
threshold, however, are not liable for any contributions but are nevertheless credited
for contributory benets. The personal allowance or the primary threshold in the
NICs schedule, whichever is lower, represents the rst tax kink in the combined in-
come tax schedule. As we show in Table 1, these two thresholds tend to track very
closely with each other.
Preferential tax treatment for corporate prots
A distinct feature of the U.K. tax system is that except at the very low end of
the income distribution, income earned as corporate prots is generally taxed at a
lower rate than non-corporate earnings such as wages and salaries (or self-employment
income). Denote the marginal corporate tax rate by  c and marginal dividend tax
rate by div, we can express the e¤ective marginal tax rate on corporate income as
 c + (1    c)div to reect the double taxation of corporate income at the personal
level. Similarly, denote the marginal personal tax rate by  p and the corresponding
employee/employer NICs rate by nicemployee/nicemployer, we can express the e¤ective
marginal tax rate on wage and salary as  p+ nicemployee+ nicemployer. Figure 1 plots
these two series at every income level between £ 0k and £ 100k in 2001-2008.
5.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis exploits two datasets. To study rmsbunching behaviour
we use administrative tax return data on the population of UK companies through
the nancial years 2001-2008. The dataset has around 8.4 million observations for
around 2.5 million separate companies and includes tax variables corresponding to
the items recorded on the corporate tax return form. Since we are interested in the
di¤erent margins through which companies respond to the tax structure, we include
additional rm characteristics and accounting variables by linking the corporation tax
return data with the FAME database. We match the tax data and accounting data for
each company and each year for approximately 90% of corporation tax returns in this
way. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables in this study. Income
variables are presented in 2005 real GBPs. Companies with zero tax liabilities account
for around 37 percent of the sample but are larger than average when measured in
terms of trading turnover or number of employees. Small companies with positive
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taxable prots below £ 50k consists around 43 percent of the sample but pay relatively
few corporate taxes. A small number of large companies with taxable prots above
£ 1,500k, on the other hand, contribute the main share of the corporate tax revenue
in the UK.16
6 The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Prot:
Evidence from the £ 300k Kink
We begin our analysis by presenting evidence of bunching at the £ 300k kink. Compan-
ies with taxable income around this level are particularly interesting for two reasons.
First, they are relatively small-sized business measured in terms of turnover and num-
ber of employees. But they are much less likely to shift income between personal and
corporate tax base compared to the owner-manager companies with lower levels of
taxable prots. The elasticity of taxable income can therefore be reasonably approx-
imated by the elasticity of corporate taxable prot. Second, companies in this group
have limited international activities. Compared to large multinational companies,
they are therefore less likely to engage in prot shifting across borders.
6.1 Basic results
Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the observed and counterfactual densities around £ 300K
in 2001, with the excluded income range demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines and
the £ 300k tax kink demarcated by the vertical-solid line. The solid line with dotted
markers plots the observed number of companies in income bins of £ 1k. Each dot
denotes the upper bound of a given bin and represents the number of companies in
each bin.17 The solid-smooth line shows the counterfactual density based on tting
a 5th order polynomial using company counts with taxable income between £ 250k
and £ 350k outside the excluded range. The next three panels focus on subsequent
periods within which the marginal tax rates around the kink remained stable. In these
panels, bunching b is dened as excess mass in the excluded range around the kink
in proportion to the average counterfactual frequency in that range, and elasticity e
is dened as in equation (13), with standard errors shown in parentheses. All the
16Specically, the top 1 percent of companies contributes about 81 percent of corporate tax payable
in the UK.
17Note that we estimate the counterfactual density and excess mass using companies counts in
income bins of £ 100. For disclousure purposes we aggregate the observed and predicted number of
companies in each income bin of £ 1,000 subject to HMRCs condentiality requirement.
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elasticity estimates are also summarised in column 3 of Table 3. We compare the
baseline elasticity estimates with those from alternative specications in Appendix
A and show that the estimated elasticity depends critically on careful specication
of the estimation range, the polynomial order, as well as the income range excluded
from estimation.
Three main ndings are worth noting in the gure. First, there is large and sharp
bunching around £ 300k. The excess mass is between 6.51 and 8.83 times the height
of the counterfactual distribution and is precisely estimated. This provides strong
evidence that companies respond to the tax structure. Second, bunching at £ 300k is
asymmetric. The income range that is clearly a¤ected by bunching around the kink
lies between £ 290k and £ 307k, and there is considerably more excess mass to the left
of the kink. Optimization error would generally lead to symmetric bunching around
the kink. Greater mass to the left of the kink appears instead to reect some risk
aversion: that companies aim just below the kink to allow for errors. Third, despite
the fact that the degree of bunching increases with the di¤erence in the marginal
net-of-tax rates, the underlying elasticity is consistently and precisely estimated to
be between 0.14 and 0.18, and the pairwise di¤erence in the elasticity estimates across
years is statistically insignicant.
6.2 Restricting income/prot shifting
The elasticity of total taxable income can be reasonably approximated by that of cor-
porate taxable income if companies have limited opportunities to shift prot between
income bases. To identify this more precisely, we therefore investigate bunching for
a restricted sample of companies with a large number of directors, where income
shifting between personal and corporate tax bases is likely to be minimal. It is also
possible that the elasticity may depend on opportunities to shift real activity and
prots abroad. To address this, we also investigate a restricted sample of companies
that appear to have no international activity. We identify this group as companies
that do not claim any double tax relief.
In the dataset, we have information on the number of directors for around 65
percent of companies.18 Intuitively, tax saving by shifting income to the lower taxed
form for at least some of the shareholders is only feasible for companies with, at most,
18A comparison between the unmatched and matched sample suggests that companies with non-
missing director numbers are on average larger in terms of trading turnover and taxable prot. For
example, the average trading turnover of the unmatched group is around 36 percent of the matched
group. Thus the possibility of income shifting is further limited in the non-missing director sample.
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a handful of directors. This is consistent with Figure 3, which lists the estimated
elasticities for companies with four, ve, eight or more directors in 2002-2006. Using
the same regression specication in the basic case, the estimated elasticity remains
0.14 for companies in the former two groups. The elasticity estimate decreases slightly
to 0.11 for companies with eight or more directors, although the di¤erence with
the full-sample elasticity is statistically insignicant at 95%. This pattern remains
qualitatively unchanged when comparing elasticity estimates for other periods, which
are summarised in Column 4-6 of Table 3.
The last panel in Figure 3 examines the elasticity of taxable prot for companies
that claim no double taxation relief in 2002-2006. Double taxation relief is a tax
credit given against UK corporation tax under the terms of a unilateral or double
taxation agreement, and is normally allowed as a deduction from the UK tax charged
on the foreign income. Any positive double tax relief allowance is therefore a good
indicator of signicant multinational activity. Around 2 percent of companies claim
non-zero double tax relief allowance in each year in the UK and almost all of them
have taxable prots that are much higher than £ 300k. Not surprisingly, estimates of
the excess mass and implied elasticity of corporate taxable income are therefore not
a¤ected when we exclude companies claiming double tax relief from estimation.
7 The Elasticity of Total Taxable Income:
Evidence from the £ 10k Kink
7.1 Dynamics of bunching at £ 10k
Compared to the £ 300k kink point with relatively stable marginal tax rates, marginal
tax rates around £ 10k went through large and frequent changes during this period.
Panel (a) in Figure 4 reports the observed number of companies in bins of £ 1k when
prots below £ 10k are taxed at a lower rate. The graphs also depict the correspond-
ing marginal tax rate in dashed lines using the right y-axis. The starting rate of
corporation tax was reduced from 10 percent in 2001 to zero in 2002. Correspond-
ingly, bunching around £ 10k is stronger in the latter year. While the marginal tax
rates remain the same in 2002-2005, a non-corporate distribution rate (NCDR) of 19
percent was in place between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2006, which was applied as
a minimum rate to corporate prots distributed to persons who are not companies.
While in theory the NCDR partially removed the benet of the starting rate, there
is no discernible decrease in the degree of bunching in 2005, the last year before the
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starting rate was abolished altogether.
Panel (b) in Figure 4 reports the observed company frequencies following the
abolition of the starting rate of tax in 2006. Starting from 2006, companies with
prots up to £ 300k were taxed at a at rate of 19 percent. Consistent with the
removal of the tax incentives, there is an immediate and large decrease in the excess
mass around £ 10k in 2006. By 2007, clustering at £ 10k is entirely due to the integer
number e¤ect and the degree of clustering is no di¤erent than clustering at any income
level that is a multiple of £ 5k. In contrast to the gradual adjustment in personal
income bunching that has been documented in Chetty et al. (2011) and Saez (2010),
these corporate earnings adapted to changes in the tax kink in a very quick and precise
way. Such di¤erences may shed some light on the type of adjustment cost in each
case. While bunching around the personal tax kink involves costs in job search and
hours choice, there may be less costly opportunities to manipulate corporate prot in
a particular year.
Figure 5 reports the observed and counterfactual densities around £ 10k using the
full sample, with the elasticity estimates summarised in column 3 of Table 4. The
regression specication now accounts for ner bunching at 5k integers at the very low
end of income distribution. We only include companies with prots up to £ 40k in
estimation. This is because prots above £ 50k (up to £ 300k) are taxed at a lower
rate, and so there are incentives to move away from the £ 50k. We therefore bound
the estimation range £ 10k away from this kink.
Bunching is symmetric around £ 10k and earnings within £ 2k of the kink are
excluded from estimation of the counterfactual. The point elasticity estimate increases
by around 0.1 from 2001 to 2002-2003 when the starting rate was further reduced to
zero, and remains around 0.57 in the later period.
Because companies bunching around £ 10k may di¤er from those around £ 300k
in many dimensions, it is not surprising that we obtain di¤erent elasticity estimates
of corporate taxable income for these two groups. On the other hand, the scope
of the tax incentives also varies for the two groups. Lowering the starting rate to
zero in 2002 also reduced the average tax rate for companies with prots between
£ 10k and £ 50k. As a result, companies with prots less than £ 50k saw a decrease in
the e¤ective average tax rate, with the largest decrease applying for companies with
prots around £ 10k. A decrease in the average tax rates represents an increased tax
advantage to incorporation. We examine whether the elasticity estimate is di¤erent
for new and existing companies and summarise the results in column 4-5 of Table 4.
The elasticity estimate for the new rms is quite similar to that for existing rms
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in 2002-2003 but signicantly decreased following the introduction of the NCDR in
2004. The decrease may imply that new companies are more inclined to distribute
more of their prot as dividends, in which case they would benet substantially less
from the zero starting rate after the NCDR was introduced.
7.2 Using post-reform distribution to estimate the counter-
factual density
The standard bunching method relies on the identication assumption that in the
absence of the tax kink, companies at the tax kink would behave similarly to com-
panies further away from the kink. If so, the distribution of taxable income had there
been no tax kinks can be predicted from the observed density outside the income
range a¤ected by the kink. As we have demonstrated in the case of £ 300k bunching,
this method requires careful choice of the excluded region around the kink point. A
conservative choice of the excluded region under-captures the full excess mass of the
rm and leads to an underestimate of the underlying elasticity. Conversely, exclud-
ing observations over a wider range underutilizes useful information in the data and
implies a loss of e¢ ciency.
The 2006 tax reform, which replaced the zero starting rate with a at rate of 19
percent for prots up to £ 300k, therefore removed the kink in taxable income at £ 10k.
This o¤ers us an opportunity to estimate directly the counterfactual distribution from
the post-reform income around the old kink. The identication assumption for this
approach is that the shape of the underlying probability density function is stationary
and does not change as a result of the tax reform. More formally, we require that
h(z) = h(zjt). Under this condition, we estimate the probability density function
over the nite income interval (zmin; zmax) non-parametrically using the histogram
estimator: bpH(j) = cj;tpost kinkPzmax
i=zmin
ci;tpost kink
;
where cj;tpost kink is the number of companies in income bin j after the abolition of
the tax kink. We choose the income interval to be between £ 2k and £ 40k so that the
counterfactual region does not include part of the bunching region for the other kink
point. We compute the counterfactual density as
cj = bpH(j)  zmaxX
i=zmin
ci;tkink ,
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and compute the excess mass, elasticity, and the associated standard errors using the
same procedure as before.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 6 show the counterfactual distribution as the dotted
line and corresponding elasticity estimate in 2002-2003 and 2004-2005, respectively.
It also shows the counterfactual distribution and elasticity estimates using the stand-
ard bunching estimation method for comparison purposes, with income between £ 8k
and £ 12k excluded from estimation and demarcated by vertical dashed lines. The
counterfactual density in the dashed line accounts for the integration constraint and
is higher everywhere to the right of the kink compared to the uncorrected density
in the solid line. Though using di¤erent estimation methods, the underlying elasti-
city estimates are broadly similar. In all three cases, the elasticity is consistently
estimated at around 0.6, and the pairwise di¤erences in the point estimates are not
statistically signicant. The fact that the three elasticity estimates are statistically
similar lends support to the validity of the identication assumption in the standard
bunching method.
7.3 Bunching twice: decomposing the elasticity of corporate
taxable income
In Section 3.1 we showed that, by analyzing the response of corporate taxable income
for companies that already bunch at the personal tax kink, the elasticity of corporate
taxable income can be decomposed into two elasticities of interest: the elasticity of
total taxable income, and the elasticity of the share of income that is recorded as
prot. While income shifting between the corporate and personal tax base has been
discussed in the literature, there is relatively little direct evidence of the size of this
behavioural response. We identify around 1.5 percent of companies with taxable
prots up to £ 50k to be bunching at the rst personal tax kink. Changes in the
marginal corporate tax rate are unlikely to a¤ect the salary payout for companies
that are at the personal income tax kink. In this case, changes in the corporate
taxable income reect changes in total taxable income. The elasticity of total taxable
income x is then equal to the elasticity of corporate taxable income scaled by the
share of total income paid as corporate prots: x = e Bc
B
, with Bc = $10k and
approximately, B = $15k.
Figure 7 depicts the counterfactual density of corporate taxable income and the
corresponding elasticity estimates for companies that bunch at the personal allowance
kink. Some companies in this group continue to bunch at the £ 10k corporate income
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kink, implying that their total reported taxable income is bunched around £ 15k. For
this group of companies, the estimated elasticity of corporate taxable income is 0.46
in 2002-3, compared to 0.57 in the full sample, and is 0.3 in 2004-2005 compared
to 0.54 in the full sample, although the di¤erence in either period is not statistically
signicant. Using these elasticity estimates, we compute the elasticity of total taxable
income x assuming that it is the same for companies with corporate prots between
£ 10k and £ 50k. Following eq. (11) we compute z, the elasticity of the share of income
taken as corporate prot with respect to the tax rate di¤erence tp   tc for the same
group. Since this depends on tp, we use two sets of personal tax rates: one applies
for the basic-rate taxpayers and one for the high-rate taxpayers, and calculate the
elasticity of the share of income as corporate prot in each case.
Table 5 summarises the corresponding tax parameters and elasticity estimates. For
companies with taxable prots between £ 10k and £ 50k, we estimate their elasticity
of total taxable income to be around 0.2-0.3. The elasticity estimate of the share of
income recorded as corporate prot for basic-rate taxpayers is around 0.06 and 0.08,
which is slightly higher compared to that for higher-rate taxpayers. The elasticity of
total income with respect to the corporation tax rate is a little higher than that at
the £ 300k kink. This may be due to a number of factors, one of which is simply that
non-recording of income may be higher at this end of the distribution. The elasticity
of the share of total income declared as prot seems surprisingly low. However, this
may be due to the same reason: if it is perceived to be relatively cheap to evade taxes,
then the main e¤ect of a change in the tax rate may be greater evasion (and hence
a fall in total declared income), rather than a switch in the form in which income is
declared.
8 Intertemporal Shifting of Corporate Taxable Prot
So far we have considered behavioural responses to corporate taxable prot accounting
for potential shifting of income across personal and corporate tax bases. Another
form of prot shifting could be intertemporal: a company may shift prots between
periods to take advantage of a lower rate in one period. If companies do engage in
such intertemporal prot shifting, then our estimated elasticities will also reect this
behavioural response.
In this section we therefore investigate the extent to which companies shift their
reported taxable prot across time in response to tax kinks, and consider the implic-
ation of such intertemporal prot shifting on the empirical estimates of the elasticity
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of corporate taxable prot. We focus our analysis on the £ 10k tax kink to exploit
additional time-series variation as a result of the 2006 tax reform that abolished the
zero starting rate.
8.1 Incentives to shift prot in two adjacent years: 2002-2005
First we analyze the tax incentives for companies to shift their reported prot across
two adjacent years when the £ 10k tax kink was in place between 2002 and 2005. To
recap, corporate taxable prots up to £ 10k were not taxed during this period, while
prots between £ 10,001 and £ 50k were taxed at 23.75 percent. The di¤erence in
these marginal tax rates could generate tax savings from allocating reported prot in
two adjacent years in such a way that the shifted prot is taxed at a lower marginal
rate. If a company has taxable prots less than £ 10k in both periods, these prots
are taxed at the same zero rate and there would be no gain from shifting prots
between periods. The same holds if taxable prot in both periods is above £ 10k. The
only circumstance when a company could benet from intertemporal prot shifting
is when the taxable prots of consecutive periods span the tax kink, i.e. above £ 10k
in one period and below in the next period, or vice versa.
For simplicity, consider the base period t when the earned prot It is below £ 10k,
and the following period t+ 1 when the earned prot It+1 is above £ 10k. In anticip-
ation of a positive growth in taxable prot and an increase in the marginal tax rate,
the company can save taxes by shifting the lesser of (It+1   $10k;$10k   It) from
period t+1. The amount of tax savings, of 23.75% of the amount shifted, depends on
both It and It+1. To illustrate, Figure 8 Panel (a) plots tax savings at di¤erent levels
of It. Once the two-period prot reaches twice the tax kink, tax savings from shifting
income between periods become at and equal the di¤erence between the tax kink
and the base-period prot It. The analysis is essentially the same if It > £ 10k > It+1.
In anticipation of a declining prot and a lower marginal tax rate, the company would
benet from shifting the lesser of (It  $10k;$10k   It+1) from period t to t+ 1.
In both cases, the presence of intertemporal prot shifting would imply that the
distribution of the observed, reported growth rate of taxable prot would be closer to
zero than that of the unobserved, true prot growth rate. We compute the observed,
reported one-period growth rate of taxable prot for companies that might engage in
intertemporal prot shifting. As a control group, we proxy for unobserved, true prot
growth rate by computing the equivalent growth rate for companies that have no
incentives to shift prot between periods, i.e. those with a two-period taxable prot
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above £ 20k who do not bunch in either period. We compare in Figure 8 Panel (b) the
distribution of the prot growth rate for these two groups. If the former does engage
in intertemporal prot shifting, we would expect a great bunching of this distribution
around a zero growth rate, and a lower variance. However, Panel (b) suggests that
there is no evidence of this, and there is no signicant di¤erence in the variance.
The abolition of the starting rate in 2006 implies that after this there was no
incentive to shift prot intertemporally across the £ 10k kink; all companies after
2006 are therefore also a valid control group. In Figure 8 Panel (c) we compare the
distribution of growth rates between 2002-2005 and 2007-2008. Again, we nd no
signicant di¤erence between the two distributions.
8.2 Incentives to shift prot from 2006 to 2005
The abolition of the starting rate of corporation tax was announced in December 2005
to take e¤ect from April 2006; after this, all corporate prots of up to £ 300k were
taxed at the small companiesrate of 19 percent. This reform not only removed the
£ 10k tax kink, but also introduced additional incentives for companies with taxable
prot less than £ 10k in 2005 to move reported taxable prot from 2006 into 2005.
Only companies with accounting period ending between December 2005 and March
2006 would have beneted from prot shifting in anticipation of the tax changes.
We would therefore expect a temporary upward spike in this group of companies
bunching around £ 10k over and above the normal extent of bunching in the absence
of the anticipated tax increase.
The change in the number of companies bunching at £ 10k due to the anticipated
tax increase can be identied by comparing the excess mass around £ 10k in 2005 to the
previous year, 2004, which had the same marginal tax rate schedule. Figure 8 Panel
(d) compares the distribution of taxable prot in these di¤erent years. Comparing
month-by-month, the Figure indicates that number of companies bunching in each
year was almost identical. In particular, there appears to be no evidence that the
excess mass around the kink point between December 2005 and March 2006 was
higher than the equivalent months of the previous year.
More formally, we compute changes in the excess mass between 2004 and 2005 and
estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable prot due to intertemporal income shifting.
Consistent with the graphical evidence, the estimated di¤erence in the excess mass
is small and statistically insignicant, with the point estimate -0.180 and a standard
error 0.299. The estimated elasticity of taxable prot due to intertemporal prot
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shifting is -0.066, with a standard error 0.110.
The estimated intertemporal income shifting e¤ect is therefore neither statistic-
ally nor economically signicant, which suggests that the measures of the underlying
structural elasticity derived in the paper are not signicantly a¤ected by intertem-
poral prot shifting. This may simply because it is di¢ cult for small companies to
re-time their income or expenditure to take advantage of the tax di¤erences described
here.
9 Marginal Deadweight Cost of Corporate Income
Tax
We now estimate the marginal deadweight cost of corporate income tax combining all
the relevant elasticity estimates from the previous sections. Following the discussion
in Section 3.1, we rst calculate the fraction of welfare loss through behavioural
responses if every company with taxable prot between £ 300k and £ 1,500k faces a
one-percent increase in their marginal corporate tax rate. In this case, the marginal
deadweight loss can be calculated using the standard formula:
dW
dM
=   eactc
(1  tc) ,
assuming that all income at the margin is declared as prot. The ratio ac denotes the
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution and measures how thin the top tail of the
corporate income distribution is. We estimate ac throughout the sample period and
plot its value in Figure 9. The upper panel plots the average value of ac for prots up
to £ 9 million and the lower panel plots ac for each year and each prot level between
£ 50 and £ 1 million. The value of ac remains quite stable over the tail of the income
distribution and is around 1.07 at £ 300k.
With an average estimate of e = 0:18 and marginal corporate tax rate of 29.75
percent, the fraction of welfare loss relative to the mechanical change in tax revenue is
around 8.2 percent if corporate prots are retained within the company or distributed
to shareholders that are taxed at the basic rate. If dividend income is taxed at the
higher rate then the estimated marginal deadweight cost increases to 17.3 percent.
Although we are not aware of any previous estimate of the deadweight cost of corpor-
ate taxes, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) calculate the fraction of tax revenue lost
through behavioural responses to be around 27.7 percent due to a small increase in
the top personal tax rate in the U.S. Their estimate applies to taxpayers at the top
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federal income tax bracket in the U.S. and is substantially larger than ours.
The above calculation assumes that corporate taxable income £ 300k follows a
Pareto distribution, allowing us to apply a common value of ac to every prot level
above the threshold. An alternative, assumption-free method is to calculate the ratio
Bc=(Bc   Ac) for every company above a certain income threshold. We follow this
approach and calculate the marginal deadweight cost due to a small increase in the
marginal tax rate for prots between £ 10k and £ 50k:
dW
dM
=
X
ki2($10k;$50k)
Bci
Bci   Ac

z    ix
(1  tc) si

=Nki :
Note that in the above expression, the corporate taxable income Bi, the overall e¤ect-
ive tax rate on total income  i, and the proportion of total income taken as corporate
prot si are rm-specic estimates. Using tax rates and elasticity estimates summar-
ised in Table 5, we estimate the marginal deadweight cost of corporate income tax
to be around 28.7 percent should the statutory corporate tax rate for prots between
£ 10k and £ 50k increase by one percent.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to
the UK statutory tax rate, and derive estimates of the marginal deadweight cost of
the tax. We use corporation tax return records that allow us to identify precisely the
taxable income of each company, and hence to identify companies that are located at
kinks in the marginal tax rate schedule. We exploit bunching of companies at these
kinks, as well as several tax reforms that took place during this period, to estimate
the elasticity.
We pay particular attention to the nature of the elasticity. For widely held com-
panies bunching at a kink at £ 300k in the tax schedule, it is reasonable to assume
that marginal increases in prot reect increases in total income. For such companies
we estimate a relatively small elasticity of between 0.14 and 0.18. This translates into
a small marginal deadweight cost: our central estimate is a marginal deadweight cost
of approximately 8% of the revenue that would have been generated by a marginal
increase in tax, ignoring behavioural responses.
However, owner-managed companies have the opportunity to choose the form in
which their income is declared for tax purposes: either as corporate prot or as
personal income. For such companies, the elasticity of corporate taxable income may
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in part be determined by changes to the proportion of total income declared as prot.
This issue is of particular importance at a much lower kink in the tax schedule at
£ 10k. To address this, we match corporation tax records with information on the
remuneration of directors taken from company accounting records. Combining the
two sources of income allows us to identify the total income of the owner/manager
and the share taken as prot. For such companies, we decompose the elasticity
of corporate taxable income into two parts: the e¤ect of changes in the tax rate
on total income and the e¤ect on the share of total income taken as prot. The
empirical decomposition is based on companies that are bunched at kinks in both the
personal tax schedule and the corporate tax schedule. For companies at the £ 10k kink
in the corporate income tax schedule, we nd much higher elasticities of corporate
taxable income with respect to the tax rate, of between 0.54 and 0.57. These can
be decomposed into (i) an elasticity of total income with respect to the net of tax
rate of between 0.2 and 0.3, and (ii) an elasticity of the share of income taken as
prot with respect to the di¤erence between the personal and corporate tax rates
of between 0.04 and 0.07. Combining these estimates generates an estimate of the
marginal deadweight cost of the tax at the £ 10k kink of around 25% of the revenue
that would have been generated by a marginal increase in tax, ignoring behavioural
responses.
We also investigate whether there is evidence that some companies shift prot
over time in order to reduce aggregate tax liabilities. In principle, the distribution of
annual growth rates of companies that did so should be biased towards zero. We nd
no evidence to support this. We also investigate whether companies responded to an
anticipated tax reform in 2006 by bringing forward income from the following year.
Again we nd no evidence that they did so. We have therefore found no evidence to
suggest that companies engage in intertemporal prot shifting at the £ 10k tax kink.
There is clearly evidence of variation in the elasticity of corporate taxable income
with respect to the tax rate across companies, especially depending on their size.
We nd a higher elasticity for companies with very low income. This may reect
the more informal nature of such companies: their accounts may not be audited and
it is plausible that evasion may be much more prevalent. Medium-sized companies
with prots around £ 300k appear to be much less sensitive to the tax rate. We
speculate, though present no evidence in support and leave for future research, that
very large companies may also have a relatively high elasticity as they may have more
opportunities to avoid tax, or to shift activities between countries.
31
References
Altshuler, Rosanne, and Harry Grubert. 2003. Repatriation Taxes, Repatri-
ation Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy.Journal of Public Economics,
87(1): 73107.
Bond, Stephen R, Lucy Chennells, and Michael P Devereux. 1996. Taxes
and Company Dividends: A Microeconometric Investigation Exploiting Cross-
Section Variation in Taxes.Economic Journal, 106(435): 32033.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel. 1999. Explaining In-
vestment Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach.Eco-
nometrica, 67(4): 783826.
Chetty, Raj. 2009. Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Su¢ cient to Calculate Dead-
weight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 1(2): 3152.
Chetty, Raj, and Emmanuel Saez. 2005. Dividend Taxes and Corporate Be-
havior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120(3): 791833.
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2011.
Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasti-
cities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
126(2): 749804.
Cooper, Russell W., and John C. Haltiwanger. 2006. On the Nature of Capital
Adjustment Costs.Review of Economic Studies, 73(3): 611633.
de Mooij, Ruud A., and Gaëtan Nicodeme. 2008. Corporate Tax Policy and
Incorporation in the EU.International Tax and Public Finance, 15(4): 478498.
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines. 2004. A Multina-
tional Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets.The
Journal of Finance, 59(6): 24512487.
Devereux, Michael P, Ben Lockwood, and Michela Redoano. 2007. Hori-
zontal and vertical indirect tax competition: Theory and some evidence from the
USA.Journal of Public Economics, 91(3-4): 451479.
32
Dharmapala, Dhammika, C. Fritz Foley, and Kristin J. Forbes. 2011. Watch
What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland
Investment Act.Journal of Finance, 66(3): 753787.
Dwenger, Nadja, and Viktor Steiner. 2012. Prot Taxation and the Elasticity
of the Corporate Income Tax Base.National Tax Journal, 65(1): 117150.
Egger, Peter, Christian Keuschnigg, and Hannes Winner. 2009. Incorpor-
ation and Taxation: Theory and Firm-level Evidence.Oxford University Centre
for Business Taxation Working Paper 0908.
Feld, Lars P., and Jost H. Heckemeyer. 2011. FDI And Taxation: A Meta-
Study.Journal of Economic Surveys, 25(2): 233272.
Feldstein, Martin. 1995. Behavioral Responses to Tax Rates: Evidence from the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.The American Economic Review, 85(2): pp. 170174.
Feldstein, Martin. 1999. Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income
Tax.The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(4): pp. 674680.
Fuest, Clemens, Shak Hebous, and Nadine Riedel. 2011. International Debt
Shifting and Multinational Firms in Developing Economies.Economics Letters,
113(2): 135 138.
Goolsbee, Austan. 1998. Taxes, Organizational Form, and the Deadweight Loss
of the Corporate Income Tax.Journal of Public Economics, 69(1): 143 152.
Goolsbee, Austan. 2004. The Impact of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence
from State Organizational Form Data.Journal of Public Economics, 88(11): 2283
2299.
Gordon, Roger, and Joel Slemrod. 2000. Are Real Responses to Taxes Simply
Income Shifting between Corporate and Personal Tax Bases? In Does Atlas Shrug:
The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich. , ed. Joel Slemrod, 24079.
Gordon, Roger H., and Je¤rey K. MacKie-Mason. 1994. Tax Distortions to
the Choice of Organizational Form. Journal of Public Economics, 55(2): 279 
306.
Graham, John R. 2003. Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review.Review of
Financial Studies, 16(4): 10751129.
33
Gruber, Jon, and Emmanuel Saez. 2002. The Elasticity of Taxable Income:
Evidence and Implications.Journal of Public Economics, 84: 132.
Gruber, Jon, and Joshua Rauh. 2007. How Elastic is the Corporate Income
Tax Base? In Taxing corporate income in the 21st century. , ed. James R. Hines
Auerbach, Alan and Joel Slemrod. Cambridge University Press.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. Tax Policy and Investment
Behavior.American Economic Review, 57(3): pp. 391414.
Hassett, Kevin A., and R. Glenn Hubbard. 2002. Tax Policy and Business
Investment.In Handbook of Public Economics. Vol. 3 of Handbook of Public Eco-
nomics, , ed. A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Chapter 20, 12931343. Elsevier.
House, Christopher L., and Matthew D. Shapiro. 2008. Temporary Invest-
ment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation.American
Economic Review, 98(3).
King, Mervyn A., and Don Fullerton. 1984. The Taxation of Income from Cap-
ital: A Comparative Study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Germany. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, and Mazhar Waseem. 2012. Behavioral Responses
to Notches: Evidence from Pakistani Tax Records.London School of Economics
Working Paper.
Liu, Li. 2012. Income Taxes and Business Incorporation: Evidence from the Early
20th Century. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper
1205.
Mackie-Mason, Je¤rey K, and Roger H Gordon. 1997. How Much Do Taxes
Discourage Incorporation? Journal of Finance, 52(2): 477505.
Manoli, Dayanand S., and Andrea Weber. 2011. Nonparametric Evidence on
the E¤ects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions.National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 17320.
Saez, Emmanuel. 2010. Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? American Eco-
nomic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(3): 180212.
34
Saez, Emmanuel, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz. 2012. The Elasticity of
Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.Journal
of Economic Literature, 50(1).
35
Figure 1. E¤ective Marginal Tax Rates by Income Type
(a) 2001 (b) 2002
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Notes: the e¤ective marginal tax rate for corporate prot accounts
for taxation of dividend income at the personal level. The e¤ective
marginal tax rate for wage and salary is the sum of the marginal
personal income tax rate, employers NICs rate and employees NICs
rate.
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Figure 2. Bunching at £ 300k: Full Sample
(a) 2001 (b) 2002-2006
(c) 2007 (d) 2008
Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of corporate taxable income in 2001-2008.
The counterfactual is a fth-order polynomial estimated as in eq. (15). The excluded ranges
around £ 300k are demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines. Bunching b is excess mass in the
excluded range around £ 300k relative to the average counterfactual frequency in this range,
and e is the implied elasticity of corporate taxable income. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
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Figure 3. Bunching at £ 300k: Selected Sample
(a) Number of Directors  4 (b) Number of Directors  5
(c) Number of Directors  8 (d) No Double Tax Relief
Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of corporate taxable income for companies
with more than 4/5/8 directors and claiming no double tax relief in 2002-2006. The coun-
terfactual is a fth-order polynomial estimated as in eq. (15). The excluded ranges around
£ 300k are demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines. Bunching b is excess mass in the ex-
cluded range around £ 300k relative to the average counterfactual frequency in this range,
and e is the implied elasticity of corporate taxable income. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
38
Figure 4. Dynamics of Bunching at £ 10k
(a) 2001-2005
(b) 2006-2008
Notes: the gure shows the distribution of corporate taxable income
in income bins of £ 1k in 2001-2008. The right y-axis depicts the
corresponding marginal tax rates in horizontal-dashed lines.
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Figure 5. Bunching at $10k: Full Sample
(a) 2001 (b) 2002-2003
(c) 2004-2005
Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of corporate taxable income in 2001-
2005. The counterfactual is a fth-order polynomial estimated as in eq. (15). The
excluded ranges around £ 10k are demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines. Bunching b
is excess mass in the excluded range around £ 10k relative to the average counterfactual
frequency in this range, and e is the implied elasticity of corporate taxable income.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
40
Figure 6. Bunching at £ 10k: Estimation Method Comparison
(a) 2002-2003
(b) 2004-2005
Notes: the gure compares the counterfactual density distribution and the
corresponding elasticity estimate using di¤erent bunching estimation meth-
ods. e uncorrected refers to the bunching estimation ignoring the integ-
ration constraint. e corrected refers to the standard bunching estimation
method which preserves the total number of companies to be the same as in the
empirical distribution. e actual refers to the bunching estimation method
based on the post-reform actual distribution of corporate taxable income.
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Figure 7. Bunching Twice at £ 10k
(a) 2002-2003
(b) 2004-2005
Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of corporate taxable income for com-
panies that bunch at the rst personal tax kink. The counterfactual is a fth-order
polynomial estimated as in eq. (15). The excluded ranges around £ 10k are demarcated
by the vertical-dashed lines. Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range around
£ 10k relative to the average counterfactual frequency in this range, and e is the implied
elasticity of corporate taxable income. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 8. Intertemporal Prot Shifting around £ 10k
(a) Tax Savings (b) Prot Growth Rate: Two Groups
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the amount of tax savings from engaging in shifting
taxable prots across two periods in the presence of di¤erent marginal tax
rates. Panel (b) compares the growth rate of taxable prot between bunching
and non-bunching companies, while Panel (c) compares the growth rate of
taxable prot for bunching companies before and after the zero starting rate
was abolished. Finally, Panel (d) plots the number of companies bunching
around £ 10k by the calendar month in which their nancial year ends.
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Figure 9. The Pareto Parameter
(a) Overall
(b) By Year
Notes: this gure shows the overall value of Parameter ratio a as a func-
tion of corporate income z between £ 0 and £ 9 million in the upper panel
and the value of a in each tax year for corporate income between £ 50k
and £ 1,000k. The ratio a is computed using the average income level
above each income threshold z, zm, divided by the di¤erence between zm
and z: namely, zmzm z .
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Table 1. Income Tax Schedules in the U.K.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Corporate tax
Income upper limit (UL)
10,000 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.2 0.21
50,000 0.225 0.2375 0.2375 0.2375 0.2375 0.19 0.2 0.21
300,000 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.2 0.21
1,500,000 0.325 0.3275 0.3275 0.3275 0.3275 0.3275 0.325 0.2975
over 1,500,000 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.28
NCDR 0 0 0 0.19 0.19 0 0 0
Dividend tax
tax credit rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
basic rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
higher rate 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325
Personal tax
personal allowance 4,535 4,615 4,615 4,745 4,895 5,035 5,225 6,035
starting rate UL 6,415 6,535 6,575 6,765 6,985 7,185 7,455 -
starting rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -
basic rate UL 29,400 29,900 30,500 31,400 32,400 33,300 34,600 34,800
basic rate 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.2
higher rate 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Employed-income NICs
Lower Earnings Limit 3,744 3,900 4,004 4,108 4,264 4,368 4,524 4,680
Upper Earnings Limit 29,900 30,420 30,940 31,720 32,760 33,540 34,840 40,040
employees contribution
primary threshold 4,524 4,628 4,628 4,732 4,888 5,044 5,200 5,435
basic rate contracted-in 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
basic rate contracted-out 0.084 0.084 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094
higher rate 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
employers contribution
secondary threshold 4,524 4,628 4,628 4,732 4,888 5,044 5,225 5,435
basic rate contracted-in 0.119 0.118 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128
basic rate contracted-out 0.089 0.083 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.091 0.091
higher rate 0.119 0.118 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128
Notes: all rates and allowances are in nominal terms. NCDR refers to the non-corporate
distribution rate. The lower basic NICs rates apply when the employee contracted out of
the State Second Pensions and are associated with the reduced benets.
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Table 3. Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Income around £ 300k
Year Increase in 1-MTR Full Sample Number of Directors No DTR
(%-points) >= 4 >= 5 >= 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2001 0.170 0.144 0.146 0.130 0.086 0.147
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
2002-2006 0.186 0.144 0.144 0.142 0.111 0.145
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
2007 0.170 0.146 0.151 0.147 0.137 0.147
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021)
2008 0.117 0.185 0.187 0.194 0.124 0.189
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.025)
Notes: the table presents estimates of the elasticity of corporate taxable income
with respect to the marginal net-of-statutory tax rate around £ 300k. Column
3 shows results for the full sample while column 4-6 show results for companies
with more than a certain number of directors. The last column shows the res-
ults for companies that claim no double tax relief. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and estimates in bold are signicant at the standard 1% level.
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A Sensitivity Analysis of Parametric Assumptions
We examine the sensitivity of the estimation strategy to alternative order of polyno-
mial, income range included for estimation and windows around the kink point for
bunching around £ 300k.19 First, while the main regression specication estimates the
counterfactual distribution of corporate taxable income using companies with taxable
prots between £ 250k and £ 350k, we explore alternative specication of estimation
range by including companies with taxable prots around [225k, 375k] and [275k,
325k]. Table A.1 summarises the estimated excess mass b and implied elasticity of
corporate taxable income e under these alternative estimation range. As illustrated,
the wider the estimation range is, the larger the implied elasticity of corporate taxable
income. This is because a wider estimation range includes more observations farther
away from kink and under-estimates the counterfactual distribution to the right of
the kink point. This in turn yields a somewhat larger elasticity estimate, although
the di¤erence with the baseline result is not statistically signicant.
Second, while the main specication excludes company counts with prot between
£ 290k and £ 307k, we estimate the counterfactual using alternative excluded ranges
that are wider and asymmetric: [£ 285k, 305k] and narrower and symmetric: [£ 293k,
307k] and [£ 295k, 305k]. For the same reason that we explain above, large elasticity
estimates are associated with wider excluded range. Lastly, while the main specic-
ation uses 5th order polynomials, we also estimate the counterfactual using 3rd-7th
order polynomials. As illustrated, the estimation strategy is insensitive to using
lower order polynomials. However, beyond 5th order polynomials, the counterfactual
are signicantly a¤ected by using higher order polynomials as they overestimate the
amount of excess mass at the kink point. Intuitively, the 5th order polynomials ap-
pear to be su¢ ciently exible to capture the patterns in the company frequencies and
provide a robust estimate of counterfactuals.
19Implications from sensitivity analysis for bunching around the £ 10k tax kink are qualitatively
the same, which are not repeated here.
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Table A.1. Bunching at £ 300k with Alternative Regression Specications
Polynomial Order Estimation Range Excluded Range Excess mass b Implied Elasticity e
basic result
5 [250k, 350k] [290k, 307k] 8.008 0.144
(1.121) (0.020)
varying estimation range:
5 [225k, 375k] [290k, 307k] 9.273 0.166
(0.823) (0.015)
5 [275k, 325k] [290k, 307k] 5.136 0.092
(2.167) (0.039)
varying excluded range:
5 [250k, 350k] [285k, 305k] 8.828 0.158
(1.273) (0.023)
5 [250k, 350k] [293k, 307k] 7.022 0.126
(0.889) (0.016)
5 [250k, 350k] [295k, 305k] 6.109 0.109
(0.640) (0.011)
varying polynomial order:
3 [250k, 350k] [290k, 307k] 8.117 0.145
(0.847) (0.015)
4 [250k, 350k] [290k, 307k] 7.022 0.126
(0.892) (0.016)
6 [250k, 350k] [290k, 307k] 5.818 0.104
(0.872) (0.016)
7 [250k, 350k] [290k, 307k] 5.818 0.104
(0.872) (0.016)
Notes: the table presents estimates of the excess mass and the elasticity of corpor-
ate taxable income with respect to the marginal net-of-statutory tax rate around
£ 300k in 2002-2006 using alternative regression specications. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and estimates in bold are signicant at the standard 1%
level.
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